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1 Introduction
Access to mortgage finance for first time homebuyers, long a topic of central policy
concern as well as the focus of extensive academic research (Duca and Rosenthal,
1994; Linneman and Wachter, 1989), has increasingly come to the fore since the
global financial crisis. Loose credit conditions and new mortgage product features
(such as interest only payments) had facilitated a considerable credit expansion in
many economies (Scanlon et al., 2008), but proved to be unsustainable. A wave
of mortgage defaults followed the 2007 crisis (Lydon and McCarthy, 2013; Jiang
et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2011), the banking sector pulled back on lending activ-
ity (Scanlon et al., 2011) and, from a financial stability perspective, global policy-
makers sought to introduce tight new regulatory restrictions on lending conditions.
These macroprudential regulations typically target loan-to-value, loan-to-income or
debt-service to income ratios and are aimed at increasing both bank and borrower
resilience to prevent a build up of systemic risk (Kashyap et al., 2011; Duca et al.,
2019).
However, while aiming to prevent systemic risk and break the pro-cyclicality of
housing and credit markets (Borgersen, 2016), an externality of these new macro-
prudential rules is more limited mortgage market access. These rules impose a regu-
latory downpayment or income constraint by increasing the deposit required and/or
tightening the income affordability criteria. A number of studies have posited that
this has been linked to a drop in homeownership (Whitehead and Williams, 2017;
Duffy et al., 2016), albeit amidst a more challenging environment for young first
time purchasers more generally (Jones, 2016; Wijburg, 2019).
In Ireland, the situation was acute given the scale of the boom-bust cycle and the
rise in the cost of housing in the recovery. Credit conditions tightened considerably
following the financial crisis as mortgage arrears soared (Kelly and O’Malley, 2016;
McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017). Layered on top of industry-driven changes, the
introduction of macroprudential regulations governing maximum loan-to-value and
loan-to-income ratios in 2015 by the Central Bank of Ireland have all led to a safer
but more restricted mortgage market. While the loan-to-value ratio in Ireland (set
at 90 per cent) is close to prior industry standards and international norms, the
loan-to-income ratio (set at 3.5*gross income) has been highlighted by industry and
politicians as relatively strict,1 as house prices have risen and rental inflation has
lowered the savings capacity of households. Indeed, research by Lydon and McCann
(2017) shows that the share of low income households entering the mortgage market
has fallen while Kelly and Mazza (2019), Gaffney (2019) and Corrigan et al. (2020)
note a high degree of binding credit access conditions amongst potential first time
house buyers in Ireland, specifically relating to the income leverage ratio.
To directly address this potential market access issue, the Irish government in-
troduced the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan Scheme in February 2018. The Scheme
1Prime Minister Leo Varadkar as well as The CEO of AIB, Ireland’s largest





provides direct public mortgages for low to middle income first time buyers through
the local authorities. An income cap of e75000 applies along with a maximum loan
size of e288,000 in urban areas.2 The value of the original commitment (e200mn
over three years) represented a major increase in the mortgage activity by local au-
thorities, whose lending in the previous 20 years had been limited to a small minority
of schemes covering tenant purchase, shared ownership and some residual lender of
last resort financing to very high credit risk borrowers. This contrasts with the his-
torical local authority lending activity which, during the 1970s and 1980s provided a
large share of first time buyer loans (Norris and Winston, 2011). The RIHL scheme
has been much more popular than envisaged at the outset with e178mn lent out in
the first 16 months for over 1,000 loans from 5,400 applications. Two attractive fea-
tures of the loan product are higher loan-to-income ratios relative to those available
through the commercial market, as well as long-term fixed interest rates at below
market levels. The use of a direct public mortgage product to address credit access
difficulties is relatively unique in recent times internationally; the use of equity style
measures such as the UK Help to Buy scheme have been more common.
To understand the relationship between the RIHL loan, the macroprudential
framework and first time buyer credit access, the contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, we exploit unique administrative application level data from the
scheme to explore the characteristics of households who have applied for the RIHL
scheme. Analysing how these borrowers compare to those accessing credit through
commercial mortgage market channels enables us to understand whether the scheme
is well-targeted at those facing credit access difficulties due to the macroprudential
regulations. If this is the case, the policy instrument can be seen as directly address-
ing the externality caused by the regulations. Second, we consider the safeguards
for the scheme in terms of rejected applications and originating credit terms to
consider whether these measures can provide adequate risk management given the
lower income nature of the target population. We believe this paper should be of
considerable interest to the general policy discussion around instruments which aim
to facilitate credit access for first time buyers under macroprudential regulations,
in particular as a complement to the discussion regarding equity schemes, such as
the UK Help to Buy scheme, which have been used more frequently to date (Jones,
2016; Whitehead and Monk, 2011).
A number of findings emerge from the research. First, we find that demand for
the scheme is coming primarily from urban, young, professional households with
permanent employment and considerable savings. Indeed over half of the applicants
in urban areas are in professional or associate professional occupations while over
40 per cent of applications are from the capital, Dublin (considerably more than
its 28 per cent population share). The profile of applicants differs in non-urban
areas where there are more joint applicants, households with children and greater
levels of existing debt. We find that the applicants’ income distribution lies to the
left (lower incomes) of those who received credit from the commercial market which
suggests these households are those who have difficulties borrowing sufficient credit
and are under-served by the commercial market under the current macroprudential
regulations.
2A lower loan cap of e225,000 applies in rural counties where house prices are lower.
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The loan-to-income levels on the applications are much greater than those which
would be attainable for these households through the commercial banks. To provide
more insight into this dynamic, we simulate the maximum borrowing capacity for
the applicants given the macroprudential regulations’ loan-to-income limit and the
applicants’ savings and compare this to the level of mortgage debt they applied
for under the RIHL scheme. A clear majority of urban applicants are applying for
much higher levels of leverage than they would receive in the commercial market.
However, there are indications of some cross-overs between the scheme and bank
lending in non-urban areas.
Given that higher leverage-to-income ratios can pose a risk to households, we
review the scheme lending conditions on loan-to-value and debt-service to income
and suggest these are well calibrated in relation to international norms as indicators
to limit risk ex-ante. We also use the administrative microdata on the application
outcome to consider the determinants of being recommended for rejection. We find
that rejections are decreasing in income and savings but increasing in loan size (for
a given income and savings level). Rejections are also higher for households in
more unstable employment (self-employed or contract workers) and for those with a
credit history problem. These findings suggest that even given the lower to middle
income profile of applicants, the type of household recommended for acceptance
would appear to be of lower risk. This should help ex-ante to limit the scale of
ex-post defaults.
From a policy perspective, our paper demonstrates that the RIHL lending prod-
uct, which has come into the market to directly address an externality from macro-
prudential regulations, appears to correctly target the group of households most
affected by the stricter loan-to-income ratio. We find that the households who are
applying for these loans are those facing income-based borrowing constraints under
the current macroprudential policies. The public credit instrument therefore is a
good example of a targeted measure that directly addresses the externality from the
broader framework. We argue that using a tailored measure such as this allows for
a strong macroprudential framework for the commercial banking sector but ensures
that first time buyers can access housing credit, once they are creditworthy. By
limiting the overall total level of credit available under the measure in euro terms,
this can ensure that such a product does not compromise overall financial stability,
as might happen if the loan-to-income was generally loosened, but can be used to
address the credit access externalities that arise from macroprudential regulations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the historical context for local authority loans in Ireland, the changes
around the macroprudential regulations and an overview of the RIHL scheme. Sec-
tion 3 presents our main analytical analysis by profiling demand for the scheme
and how this interacts with the broader mortgage market. Section 4 discusses risk
management and section 5 concludes.
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2 Background and Policy Context
2.1 Local Authority Lending in Ireland and Its Decline
Local authority mortgage lending has had a long history in Ireland. Dating back to
the Small Dwellings Acquisitions Act in 1899, loans through local public bodies have
provided an opportunity for credit constrained Irish households to access financing
for home purchase.










































































Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage Local Authority Loan Statistics.
Prior to the late 1980s, local authorities were key players in the first time buyer
lending market. In 1987, local authority loans were instead restricted to low-income
households who had failed to obtain a mortgage from a commercial lender Fahey
et al. (2004). Figure 1 documents this dramatic post 1987 decrease in the num-
ber, and consequently the share of total new mortgage lending, provided by local
authorities. This combination of changes to local authority scheme parameters, as
well as the increasing levels of credit available from banks and building societies in
the commercial lending sector, led to the share of total new mortgage lending done
by local authorities falling from approximately one third of new loans in 1982 to
less than 1 per cent in 1995 (Figure 1), more or less remaining at this level until
2018. Virtually all new mortgage lending between 1995-2017 took place through the
commercial market.
Prior to local authority loans being restricted to low-income households unable
to obtain credit from a commercial lender in 1987, it was in fact commonplace for
local authorities to provide mortgage loans to households right across the income
distribution (Fahey et al., 2004). Figure 2 presents the proportion of the stock
of mortgage loans that are accounted for by issuer type for each income decile.
In 1987, at the point where local authority loans were instead restricted to low-
income households who had failed to obtain a mortgage from a commercial lender,
approximately 40-45 per cent of mortgage loans were provided by local authorities for
households from the 3rd to the 7th decile of the income distribution. Between 1987
and 1999, we observe a fall in the share of Tenant Purchase mortgages and a greater
role for commercial lenders for every decile in the income distribution. The share of
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mortgages issued by local authorities decreased in the 3rd to 10th income deciles.
However, the share of local authority mortgages actually rose among borrowers in
the lowest two income deciles over this period.
The reduction in mortgage lending to all but the lowest income borrowers by local
authorities is also noted by Norris and Winston (2011) who find that with the credit
boom and widespread access to commercial mortgage financing, the creditworthiness
of local authority mortgage holders decreased. This countercyclical relationship
between local authority and commercial lending is further highlighted by Shiels
et al. (2007). They note that high levels of local authority lending were the norm
during the 1970s and 1980s when households faced great difficulties in obtaining
credit from banks and building societies, compared to low levels of LA lending
coinciding with the relative ease of obtaining credit during the 1990s and early
2000s. As a consequence, local authority loans issued during periods of abundant
commercial market credit go to high risk borrowers who are associated with high
levels of mortgage arrears. It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that local authority
lending since the late 1980s has been associated with very high levels of mortgage
arrears. As of 2017Q4, just prior to the introduction of the RIHL scheme, 24 per
cent of local authority mortgages were in arrears of more than 90 days3. Norris
et al. (2007) discuss the challenges associated with subsidising home-ownership for
these very low income households, concluding that there are “structural limits” to
home-ownership and that alternative tenures are required.
2.2 Back from the brink: the financial crisis and its aftermath
The scale of commercial lending continued to grow during the credit boom of the
early to mid 2000s. Mortgage credit was originated under loose credit conditions
(McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017), with households borrowing large mortgages at
high loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios. At the height of the boom nearly
40,000 FTB loans a year were issued (Figure 3a) and Kelly et al. (2018) show that
loan-to-income ratios went as high as 6.5 for some borrowers with a large number
of mortgages at 100 per cent LTV. As the 2008 banking crisis began to propagate
through the real economy, borrowers with loans issued under loose credit conditions
found themselves unable to withstand the economic shocks, resulting in wide-scale
arrears (Kelly and O’Malley, 2016; Lydon and McCarthy, 2013; Kelly et al., 2012).
There was a significant contraction in the supply of credit during the crisis years
which at its lowest point in 2011 saw only 6300 FTB loans drawn down. In the wake
of the financial crisis banks considerably tightened their lending standards.
In 2015 the Central Bank of Ireland introduced macroprudential regulations
limiting LTV and LTI ratios, with the dual aims of both increasing the resilience of
both banks and borrowers and preventing credit driven house price surges. While
there has been a noticeable pickup in credit extended to first time buyers since 2014,
both in terms of the number of loans, and as a proportion of the home-buyer age
population, the figures for 2018 stand at less than half those of 2004 (Figure 3).
In the context of the appropriate tightening in lending standards and required
3Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage Local Authority Loan Arrears
Statistics.
5
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gross Income Decile
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gross Income Decile
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gross Income Decile
Mortgage - LA Mortgage - TP
Mortgage - Other
Source: Household Budget Surveys 1987, 1994 and 1999. Mortgage - LA refers to local authority issues mortgages;
Mortgage - TP are mortgages issued under the Tenant Purchase Scheme; Mortgage - other refers to mortgages
issued by all other providers, namely those issued by banks, building societies and insurance companies. These
charts present the stock of mortgages at a specific point in time.
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Source: Banking Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI) and CSO population statistics by age bands.
implementation of macroprudential regulations post global financial crisis, a natural
externality has been tighter credit conditions for many first time buyers in Ireland.
Lydon and McCann (2017) show that relative to pre-2008 levels, very few Irish
households at the lower end of the income distribution now obtain mortgage credit.
More recently, Kelly and Mazza (2019) find that the macroprudential rules are
increasingly binding for first time buyers in Ireland, in particular in the Dublin
area.
Furthermore, recent research by Corrigan et al. (2020) explores credit demand
amongst Irish renters and finds a notable credit gap whereby households have insuf-
ficient incomes or savings to purchase a property given the current house prices due
to the macroprudential limits. They argue these households could be reasonably
classified as lendable from a credit risk perspective which suggests that extending
credit to these households would not represent an excessive risk. The research points
out that a targeted instrument such as a public lending instrument could alleviate
a portion of the lending gap for these households.
2.3 The RIHL Scheme
Against this backdrop, the Irish government introduced the Rebuilding Ireland Home
Loan Scheme in February 2018 (Scheme details below). The objective of the RIHL
scheme is to support access to home-ownership for credit worthy low to middle in-
come first time buyers unable to secure sufficient funds elsewhere. The scheme is
administered through all 31 local authorities in Ireland. Applications are submitted
to the relevant local authority and then passed to the Housing Agency, a centralised
body, for underwriting assessment where trained underwriters carry out an assess-
ment of the borrower’s creditworthiness in accordance with the RIHL credit policy.
In contrast to previous Irish local authority lending schemes, RIHL sets a maxi-
mum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 90 per cent, in line with the LTV limits applied
by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) in the commercial mortgage lending market.
Borrowers must provide a minimum of 3 per cent of the value of the property in
evidenced savings, while a maximum of 7 per cent may be in the form of a gift. The
scheme is essentially targeted at those who face LTI and affordability constraints
in the commercial lending sector. The scheme has no LTI limit, but instead has
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a debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limit ensuring that repayments (all debt) do not
exceed 35 per cent of net income; the limit falls for lower income households.
Two loan products are offered: a 2 per cent fixed rate loan for up to 25 years;
and a 2.25 per cent fixed rate loan for up to 30 years4. As the scheme is aimed
at low and middle income borrowers, gross income caps of e50,000 (e75,000) for
single (joint) applicants apply. The maximum market value of properties that can
be purchased is set at e320,000 for properties in the three largest urban counties of
Dublin, Cork, Galway, as well as the Dublin commuter counties of Kildare, Louth,
Meath and Wicklow, and e250,000 elsewhere. See O’Toole and Slaymaker (2020b)
for a full overview of the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan Scheme.
From Figure 1 we can see that in 2019 this led to the largest number of local
authority mortgages being issued since 1992. These RIHL loans represented a major
increase in the lending activity by local authorities, whose lending in the previous
20 years had been limited to a small minority of schemes covering tenant purchase,
shared ownership and some residual lending of last resort financing.
Given this context as well as the historical role of local authorities, pre 1987,
in providing mortgage credit for those in the middle of the income distribution
during periods of restricted access to credit, it raises the question of what role can
a revamped RIHL scheme play in the current climate to increase lending to those
currently under-served by the commercial market. The remainder of this paper
uses unique applicant level data to provide an overview of who is applying for these
loans, the extent to which their demand represents a market gap relative to the credit
available from the banking sector under the macroprudential rules, and finally, to
examine issues around the safe underwriting of these loans and default risk.
3 Profiling Credit Demand
In this section, we exploit unique, granular application level microdata for the Re-
building Ireland Home Loan Scheme to provide an insight into: a) which households
are applying for the loans across Ireland; b) what levels of credit they are demand-
ing; and c) whether they would receive this credit in the commercial market, a clear
indicator of scheme additionality. These data are collected by the Irish Housing
Agency and were provided by the Irish Department of Housing, Local Government
and Heritage (DHLGH) for a recent review of the scheme by O’Toole and Slaymaker
(2020b) which we expand upon in this paper.
The dataset contains all applications sent to the Housing Agency by local au-
thorities for underwriting between the start of the scheme in February 2018 and
5th September 2019 for 29/31 local authorities; no data were provided for Longford
or Meath. Depending on their resources, some local authorities screen out incom-
plete applications or applicants who are ineligible for the scheme prior to forwarding
applications to the Housing Agency for underwriting, while others simply send all
applications they receive. We therefore exclude any applications marked as invalid
to ensure consistency across local authorities. We also exclude applications for the
Tenant Purchase Scheme, a scheme which allows existing social housing tenants to
4A 2.3 per cent variable rate loan product for up to 30 years was discontinued in August 2019
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purchase their local authority property at a heavily discounted price, from our sam-
ple. Although these applicants are included within the RIHL Scheme numbers, in
practice, this is a separate scheme and these applicants purchasing a currently state
owned property at below market price are not comparable with those purchasing
from the market at full market price. Our final sample is composed of all valid,
non-Tenant Purchase applications with full information for the socio-economic and
loan application characteristics shown in Table 1.
3.1 Borrower Characteristics - Who and Where?
In order to provide an overview of where the demand for RIHL loans is located in
Ireland and which borrowers are applying for these loans, this section of the paper
provides an overview of the characteristics of households applying as well as their
geographic location. Figure 4 plots the number of applications in our sample by
local authority and clearly shows a higher number of applications in the urban areas
of Dublin in particular, but also Cork and surrounding areas. Indeed 72 per cent of
the applications in our sample have been made in local authorities with the higher
e320,000 house price threshold, with the four Dublin local authorities accounting
for just over 40 per cent of the total applications5.









Source: RIHL applicant level microdata. Data not provided for Longford and Meath.
5For comparison, 2016 Census figures show that 28 per cent of the total population live in one
of the four local authorities in Dublin, and 60 per cent live in areas covered by the higher e320,000
house price threshold.
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This distinction between 320k and 250k house price threshold areas can broadly
be thought of as the separation between major urban areas and their surrounds, and
the remainder of the country. Given the different levels of affordability challenges
in these respective areas (Allen-Coghlan et al., 2019), with typically much greater
pressures in the more urban areas, in Table 1 we present summary statistics on RIHL
applicants separately for the 320k and 250k areas. The age structure of applicants
is similar across the two areas, with the majority of applicants falling in the 31-40
age band. Less urban areas see a slightly higher proportion of older applicants,
with 320k areas seeing a greater share of applicants below 30. Regarding household
composition, there are slightly more single applicants in the urban areas, but sizeable
differences in terms of children, with more than half having no dependants compared
to just over one third in less urban areas.
One aspect which is common across areas is the significant proportion of ap-
plicants, approximately one quarter, currently recorded as paying zero rent. This
suggests that a sizeable number of applicants remain living in the family home
while saving for a deposit. Given the high level of house prices in Ireland, even
a deposit of 10 per cent could be challenging for renters to accumulate given the
well documented rental affordability challenges in the Irish market (Corrigan, Foley,
McQuinn, O’Toole and Slaymaker, 2019; O’Toole et al., 2020).
Regarding employment, more than 90 per cent of applicants in both areas are
employed on permanent contracts, with a marginally higher share of self-employed
in the less urban areas. In terms of occupation, there are some noticeable differences.
Half of applicants in the 320k areas are employed in professional or associate profes-
sional occupations, compared to just over one third of applicants in the 250k areas.
In contrast, the less urban areas see higher proportions of services and sales, trades,
and elementary occupation workers. The high proportion of applicants from profes-
sional occupations in urban areas is likely to be a reflection of the acute affordability
challenges in these areas (Corrigan, Foley, McQuinn, O’Toole and Slaymaker, 2019)
(Allen-Coghlan et al., 2019). These applicants would typically be expected to be
able to access credit through the banking sector given their employment credentials.
Their use of the RIHL scheme would therefore suggest high levels of credit access
difficulties.
Turning to income, the mean gross income of applicants in urban areas was
roughly e8000 more than in the 250k areas. Figure 5a shows that the income
distribution for the urban areas lies clearly to the right of that for the less urban
250k areas. Relatively few applicants in non-urban areas had an income greater
than e50,000. Figure 5b plots the distribution of applicant savings6. More than 20
per cent of applicants in 250k areas, and just over 15 per cent in 320k areas, only
had between 0 and e5,000 in documented savings. This might suggest that many of
these applicants may be relying on a gift to make up the remainder of the minimum
10 per cent deposit. Along with having lower incomes and savings, more than twice
as many applicants in 250k areas had an issue flagged up during their credit check
(ICB issue).
6These savings refer to the documented level of savings in an applicant’s savings account. They
do not contain any potential gift an applicant may receive towards a down-payment unless this
has already been gifted.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Applicants by 320k and 250k Areas
320k Areas 250k Areas
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Age 35.558 6.317 36.326 6.434
% Aged:
18-30 0.232 0.422 0.183 0.387
31-40 0.560 0.496 0.570 0.495
41-50 0.189 0.391 0.223 0.417
>50 0.019 0.137 0.023 0.151
% in Employment Status:
Permanent 0.938 0.241 0.917 0.277
Self-Employed 0.049 0.217 0.067 0.250
Contract/Temporary 0.012 0.110 0.016 0.124
Not Employed 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.031
% in Occupation:
Managers 0.090 0.286 0.094 0.292
Professionals 0.300 0.458 0.190 0.393
Associate Professionals 0.216 0.411 0.160 0.367
Clerical Support 0.083 0.276 0.074 0.261
Services and Sales 0.132 0.339 0.181 0.386
Craft and Trades 0.047 0.211 0.099 0.299
Plant and Machinery 0.050 0.217 0.076 0.265
Elementary 0.073 0.259 0.118 0.323
Other 0.010 0.101 0.008 0.088
Mean Dependants 0.802 1.073 1.164 1.114
% with No. Dependants:
0 0.550 0.498 0.375 0.484
1 0.197 0.398 0.227 0.419
2 0.173 0.378 0.275 0.447
3+ 0.080 0.271 0.122 0.328
% Joint Applicants 0.566 0.496 0.609 0.488
Mean Allowable Income (e) 45675 12809 37390 12351
Mean Savings (e) 23731 18883 18195 17220
Mean Loans Outstanding (e) 1235 4519 2413 7918
% with recorded rent 0 0.260 0.439 0.226 0.418
Rent (if not 0) (e) 806 393 588 241
Mean Requested Loan Size (e) 209941 57570 145459 45148
Mean Requested LTI 4.713 1.237 4.128 1.472
ICB issue 0.023 0.149 0.054 0.227
Observations 2633 1031
11
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3.2 What Levels of Credit were they Demanding?
Having profiled the characteristics of applicants in section 3.1, the aim of this sub-
section is to examine the level of credit demanded by RIHL applicants. In order to
do so, we will focus on key measures such as the requested loan size, loan-to-income
and loan-to-value ratios.
Just over 15 per cent of applicants in urban (320k) areas applied for the maximum
loan size, with just over 5 per cent of applicants doing the same in non-urban (250k)
areas (Figure 6a). This is perhaps unsurprising given previous research showing
that first time buyers in urban areas, and particularly those in and around Dublin,
face the most acute affordability challenges (Allen-Coghlan et al., 2019). However,
interestingly, despite a significant proportion of applications at the maximum loan
threshold in urban areas, the numbers below the maximum were not significant.
This may reflect the binding nature of other limits such as the LTV or DSTI which
leave households loan sizes below the maximum.
Turning to LTIs, in urban areas, the majority of applicants requested an LTI of
between 4.5 and 5, significantly above the 3.5 permitted under the macroprudential
regulations. It is also clear from Figure 6b that a significant proportion of applicants
applying in non-urban areas requested an LTI of less than the 3.5 limit imposed by
the macroprudential regulations. This raises the question whether these applicants
are strictly in need of the RIHL scheme in order to enter the home-ownership market.
We see significantly less variation in terms of LTVs (Figure 6c). Just over 60 per
cent of applicants in the e320,000 house price areas requested at or very close to
the maximum 90 per cent LTV, with the figure standing at just under 60 per cent
in the less urban local authorities. A minority of applicants (6 per cent) requested
an LTV above the maximum 90 per cent limit set by the scheme parameters.
When we examine LTIs and LTVs across the income distribution (Figure 7)7,
we observe that while the mean LTI falls with income, the mean LTV generally
increases with income. We see that the lower income applicants to the scheme
have lower requested LTVs, but require higher LTIs. This suggests that these are
7We are unable to separate this by 320k v 250k areas due to small sample sizes in some groups.
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Figure 6: Requested Loan Size, Loan-to-Income (LTI) and Loan-to-Value (LTV)
Ratios
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LTV is calculated on the sub-sample of 1530 observations for whom a property price is recorded; the prospective
property price is frequently not recorded in this initial application.
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households with a more than sufficient deposit but who are unable to borrow from
the market due to being LTI constrained. Conversely, the higher income households
have LTVs much closer to 90. The rise in LTVs for applicants earning more than
e50,000 likely represents the areas these applicants come from. In Section 3.1 we
showed only small numbers of applicants in less urban areas earning more than
e50,000, so the majority of these applicants will be living in urban areas with high
house prices, driving up LTVs.
The mean LTI is fairly consistent, at or just below 4.5, for those earning e40,000-
60,000. For incomes greater than e65,000 the mean LTI tails off considerably,
only marginally above the macroprudential policy limit of 3.5. This relationship is
mechanical as the e288,000 loan limit and the income limit naturally restrict the
leverage rates of higher income households.
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LTV is calculated on the sub-sample of 1530 observations for whom a property price is recorded; the prospective
property price is frequently not recorded in this initial application.
Finally, in Table 2 we present a series of OLS regressions to determine statis-
tically significant differences in incomes, requested loan sizes and requested LTIs
across various applicant characteristics separately for the 320k and 250k areas. In
comparison with those in permanent employment, the self-employed earn less re-
gardless of area. Interestingly, while in the less urban areas workers on temporary
contracts face lower earnings of a similar magnitude to the self-employed, in urban
areas workers on temporary contracts’ earnings are not statistically different from
those in permanent employment. With regards to age, in urban areas earnings de-
crease with age, while in the non-urban areas there are no statistically significant
differences across age bands.
Loan size decreases with age in both areas, perhaps reflecting differences in the
available loan terms. In urban areas, having children is associated with requesting
a larger loan. However, in non-urban areas there are no differences depending on
if or how many children the applicants have. In terms of LTIs, regardless of area,
applicants aged 40 and over request lower LTIs, while the self-employed request
significantly higher LTIs than permanent workers.
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Table 2: Mean Income, Loan Size, LTI split by Characteristics and 320k v 250k
Areas
Income Loan Size LTI
320k 250k 320k 250k 320k 250k
Aged:
18-30 - - - - - -
31-40 -1,107* 1,685 -5,501** -743.9 0.0164 -0.140
(613.0) (1,025) (2,728) (3,643) (0.0599) (0.123)
41-50 -2,770*** 1,782 -30,336*** -15,082*** -0.337*** -0.653***
(793.7) (1,201) (3,532) (4,266) (0.0775) (0.144)
>50 -5,313*** 2,719 -75,067*** -54,842*** -1.173*** -1.685***
(1,850) (2,586) (8,232) (9,189) (0.181) (0.310)
Employment Status:
Permanent - - - - - -
Contract/Temporary -857.4 -6,969** -7,453 -34,812*** -0.159 -0.434
(2,214) (3,006) (9,853) (10,682) (0.216) (0.360)
Self-Employed -7,895*** -6,383*** -20,490*** 2,973 0.655*** 1.119***
(1,151) (1,503) (5,121) (5,341) (0.112) (0.180)
Occupation:
Managers - - - - - -
Professionals 1,514 1,355 2,433 9,754* -0.115 -0.0552
(921.1) (1,476) (4,099) (5,244) (0.0899) (0.177)
Associate Professionals -1,868* -4,279*** -8,502** -15,432*** -0.00336 -0.0786
(962.6) (1,512) (4,283) (5,373) (0.0940) (0.181)
Clerical Support -2,759** -7,793*** -9,221* -26,650*** 0.0520 0.101
(1,167) (1,810) (5,192) (6,434) (0.114) (0.217)
Services and Sales -3,464*** -7,409*** -11,325** -27,387*** 0.0909 0.00380
(1,049) (1,478) (4,668) (5,251) (0.102) (0.177)
Craft and Trades -1,358 -2,894* -7,828 -17,188*** -0.0926 -0.187
(1,391) (1,696) (6,190) (6,029) (0.136) (0.203)
Plant and Machinery -407.3 -6,729*** -3,658 -19,312*** -0.116 0.223
(1,367) (1,830) (6,082) (6,502) (0.133) (0.219)
Elementary -3,590*** -5,244*** -11,572** -24,422*** 0.154 -0.0780
(1,215) (1,609) (5,406) (5,719) (0.119) (0.193)
Other -6,152** -5,660 -34,857*** -10,321 -0.321 0.0948
(2,537) (4,367) (11,286) (15,521) (0.248) (0.524)
No. Dependants:
0 Dependants - - - - - -
1 Dependant 3,534*** 1,255 14,556*** -2,389 -0.0150 -0.185
(643.3) (993.5) (2,862) (3,531) (0.0628) (0.119)
2 Dependants 4,757*** 1,683* 13,021*** -691.5 -0.202*** -0.215*
(691.1) (973.4) (3,075) (3,459) (0.0675) (0.117)
3+ Dependants 3,054*** 4,060*** 9,320** 750.6 -0.0444 -0.280*
(950.4) (1,260) (4,229) (4,477) (0.0928) (0.151)
Constant 46,598*** 39,064*** 220,517*** 165,186*** 4.822*** 4.485***
(927.8) (1,463) (4,128) (5,198) (0.0906) (0.175)
Observations 2,633 1,031 2,633 1,031 2,633 1,031
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3.3 Interaction with Broader Mortgage Market
Having profiled the characteristics of RIHL applicants in section 3.1 and the levels
of credit demanded in section 3.2, the aim of this subsection is to examine why
there is a demand for the RIHL scheme and how the scheme fits more broadly
within the Irish mortgage market. In order to do so, we focus on comparing RIHL
applicants with those who have accessed mortgage finance through the commercial
mortgage market to establish whether these types of applicants are under-served by
the commercial mortgage market, or whether there is some overlap between local
authority and commercial market mortgage lending. This should give us insight as
to whether the households targeted by RIHL are in fact excluded from the market.

























Gross Income ( 000s)
Private Renter RIHL Applicant
CBI Mortgage Holder
As the maximum 90% LTV is the same across the RIHL and commercial mort-
gage market lending, in this section we will focus on which parts of the income
distribution the respective buyers are coming from, along with the LTI distribution.
As a starting point, Figure 8 compares the income distribution for three groups:
private renters, RIHL applicants and new mortgage holders who have obtained a
mortgage from a commercial provider. While not all renters would be suitable can-
didates for a mortgage, Corrigan, Cotter and Hussey (2019) found that 86 per cent
of renters in Ireland expressed a preference for home-ownership in their recent sur-
vey. As we would expect the majority of first time buyers to be in the private rental
sector prior to purchasing, private renters provide a useful comparison group. Fig-
ure 8 clearly shows there is little overlap between the private rental and commercial
mortgage market income distributions. 60 per cent of private renters have an income
of below e50,000, while only approximately 20 per cent of new mortgages went to
households in this income range. At a first glance, in terms of incomes, the RIHL
scheme would appear to provide a bridge between these two groups, with 55 per
cent of applications coming from households with an income between e30-50,000
and a further 15 per cent with an income up to e30,000.
Figure 9 provides a more detailed comparison of the income distributions of
FTBs in the commercial market with RIHL applicants for the 320k and 250k areas.
The first thing to note is the difference in the distributions of commercial market
mortgage holders between the two groups. The 320k area mortgage holder income
16
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Gross Income ( 000s)
CBI Mortgage Holder RIHL Applicant
distribution peaks at e65-70,000 compared to between e45-55,000 in the 250k areas.
In part this likely reflects the differences in house prices between the areas. In the
more urban areas, the RIHL peak is substantially lower at e45-50,000. In addition,
there is a sizeable drop off after e50,000 in these areas which may be due to the
higher proportion of single applicants in these areas (see Table 1). In the 250k areas
the mortgage holder distribution peaks between e45-55,000, but nearly 30 per cent
of applicants in these areas had an income at or below 30,000 which highlights the
differences in the types of applicants in the two areas. We see that relative to more
urban areas, a greater share of non-urban households in the commercial mortgage
market are found in the lower portion of the income distribution, with 35 per cent
earning up to e50,000 relative to just 13 per cent in urban areas. There is therefore
a greater overlap between the two distributions in non-urban areas relative to in
the urban areas. Nevertheless, it is clear that the RIHL applicant distributions lie
markedly to the left of the CBI FTB distributions in both areas.
As the RIHL scheme requires a maximum LTV of 90 per cent, in line with the
macroprudential regulations, the RIHL scheme is therefore targeted at those who
are constrained by the maximum 3.5 LTI condition. It is therefore unsurprising that
Figure 10 shows such large disparities between the LTIs of existing mortgage holders
and the requested LTIs of RIHL applicants. In the commercial market, more than
40 per cent of FTB borrowers in urban areas have an LTI in the highest permissible
band, 3.25-3.5, compared to only 25 per cent in the 250k non-urban areas. In
contrast, two thirds of RIHL applicants in urban areas requested an LTI greater
than 4.5. In the non-urban areas approximately one third of applications requested
an LTI between 3.5-4.5, with just over a third requesting an LTI greater than 4.5.
Perhaps surprisingly, 30 per cent of applicants requested an LTI of 3.5 or lower.
As these borrowers would be expected to be able to obtain the requested level of
funds from the banking sector providers, it does raise the question of whether these
applicants are strictly in need of the RIHL scheme in order to become homeowners.
Figures 9 and 10 provide evidence of a clear discord between those receiving credit
from the commercial sector and those applying for the RIHL scheme. In order to
facilitate lending, 20 per cent of new mortgage lending to FTBs is permitted above
17






















































































































































CBI Mortgage Holder RIHL Applicant
the 3.5 LTI limit set out in the macroprudential regulations (Kinghan, 2018). We
may therefore expect these exemptions to provide a bridge between the commercial
lending sector and RIHL applicants. Table 3 provides a comparison between those
who received an LTI exemption and RIHL applicants recommended for approval.
Focusing on mean values, Table 3 shows that there are substantial differences on
average between these two groups. Those granted LTI exemptions have a mean
income which is almost e30,000 higher, while their mean loan size is e90,000 more
than those requested by RIHL applicants. It is also clear from Figure 11 that very
few of the exemption cases have an LTI above 4.5, with a mean LTI of 4, compared
to a mean of 4.4 for RIHL applicants. This highlights that the types of borrowers
applying for the RIHL scheme are under-served by the commercial market, and are
on average not appearing to benefit from LTI exemptions either.
Table 3: Comparison of Characteristics of FTB Borrowers With and Without LTI
Exemptions with Approved RIHL Applications
Characteristic Without With RIHL
Mean gross income (e) 72,991 74,590 45,223
Mean loan size (e) 201,433 288,891 198,877
Mean house price (e) 269,094 371,378 -
Mean loan-to-income 2.9 4.0 4.4
Mean interest rate (%) 3.1 3.1 2.2
Mean loan term 29 32 28
Mean age 35 33 35
Joint applicants (%) 72.2 62.6 56.3
Dublin (%) 28.2 66.6 47.5
While Table 3 is informative, mean characteristics may be skewed by high in-
come and house price values in particular. From Figure 11 we see that the income
distribution for households who received an LTI exemption in order to access credit
through the commercial market peaks at e50-55,000, substantially lower than the
overall commercial mortgage market income distribution which peaks at e65-70,000.
However, it does appear that the RIHL income distribution is much more concen-
trated on borrowers below e50,000 income levels than either those with or without
18
an LTI allowance in the commercial market.
Figure 11: Comparison of Income Distributions - CBI Mortgage Holders by LTI












































































































Gross Income ( 000s)
No Exemption Exemption
RIHL Applicant
A final piece of evidence we present to explore the exclusion hypothesis is to
compare how much the applicants could borrower on the scheme relative to what
they would be able to borrow under the commercial macroprudential regulations. If
applicants are able borrow a similar amount under the scheme than in the market,
it is likely they are not credit constrained. Figure 12 plots an applicant’s requested
loan size against the counterfactual loan size they should be able to obtain from the
market under current macroprudential regulations (3.5 LTI, 90% LTV) given their
income. We therefore define the following counterfactual simulated loan as 3.5 times
the applicant’s income as per the Central Bank of Ireland regulations. Applicants
above the red 45 degree line have a larger counterfactual loan relative to the size of
the loan they requested under the RIHL scheme, implying that they would be able
to obtain a larger loan from the market and therefore should not need to avail of the
RIHL scheme. From Figure 12 in 320k areas, a majority of borrowers are below the
45 degree line meaning they can borrow more under RIHL than in the market. In
the 250k areas, there is clearly some evidence of crossover between the market and
the scheme. Certain applicants may be trying to access the RIHL to benefit from
the favourable loan terms/price, rather than strictly being in need of the scheme to
become a FTB.
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Notes: The red line is a 45 degree line. The green line represents maximum loan size thresholds (e288,000 in 320k
areas and e225,000 in 250k areas). Applicants below the red line would not be able to obtain this requested loan
size from the market under current macroprudential regulations (3.5 LTI) given their income. Applicants above the
red line would be expected to be able to obtain a greater loan size from the market.
4 Risk and Rejection: Safeguarding the Scheme
To this point, we have considered the demand side of the scheme in terms of who
is looking to access credit. However, to ensure a sustainable mortgage book and
safeguard the scheme against excess credit risk, it is critical that good underwriting
practices are followed at origination, credit policy parameters are set appropriately
and ex-post default risks are assessed. The evidence from the global boom and
bust in the mortgage market from the mid-2000s onwards has clearly highlighted
the consequences of a loosening of underwriting practices and the extension of large
volumes of credit to households at high leverage and loan to income multiples (An-
derson et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2014). This was also clearly the case in Ireland as
shown by McCarthy and McQuinn (2017).
Given that the scheme directly loosens the macroprudential loan-to-income cap,
this is likely to have implications for borrower leverage, which could give rise to
heightened risk. We directly discuss the choice of the other credit conditions (loan-
to-value and debt-service to income) of the scheme which are set to address this
consideration. Second, we consider the screening in terms of rejections and accep-
tances to the scheme which will provide insights into which types of borrowers are
gaining access to this public mortgage credit scheme.
4.1 Lending Parameters, Indebtedness and Repayment Capacity
As noted above, the RIHL scheme does not have an explicit loan-to-income cap and
our analysis in Section 3 shows that this has enabled a cohort of excluded low to
middle income borrowers a route through which to access credit. However, allowing
higher income leverage ratios is likely to add risk for these borrowers in terms of loan
repayment. However, to address this risk, the RIHL scheme has an explicit LTV
limit of 90 per cent and a debt-service-to-income (DSTI) limit which acts to ensure
mortgage payments are affordable. In this section, we consider the calibration of
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these limits and their ability to provide risk protections.
In the RIHL credit policy a maximum debt-service to income (DSTI) ratio is set
at 35 per cent of disposable income, but this falls to 30 per cent for lower income
households. Having a lower limit for the lowest income households is prudent and
30 per cent is an accepted international norm for the benchmark of high housing
costs (Corrigan, Foley, McQuinn, O’Toole and Slaymaker, 2019). Some limited
exemptions are available from the 35 per cent rule whereby local authority credit
committees can allow up to 40 per cent.
The DSTI limit, is in contrast to the loan-to-income ratio used in the Central
Bank of Ireland’s macroprudential framework. However, given the fact that much of
its motivation clearly stems from households facing borrowing constraints under the
macroprudential rules, it is not unsurprising that an alternative tool is used. Indeed,
there is much debate internationally whether LTI or DSTI tools are more effective
and many countries use DSTI limits. Indeed, recent research by Gerardi et al. (2017)
and O’Toole and Slaymaker (2020a) clearly indicates that the debt service to income
ratio is a critical measure in determining default risk i.e. the income affordability
channel is the main driver of mortgage arrears. Therefore specifically limiting the
DSTI can help to address this.
To provide some international evidence in relation to the parametrisation of the
debt-service to income ratio, Table 4 presents the levels of debt-service-to-income
restrictions set by other European countries and the RIHL parametrisation. It must
be noted that the comparison of these instruments across countries is complicated
by the different definitions used. Nevertheless, it is clear that the RIHL limit is at
the lower end of the scale relative to international norms. Given that this scheme
specifically targets low to middle income borrowers, this would seem appropriate.
Table 4: Overview of Debt-Service-to-Income Ratios Across Europe
Country Year Cap Exemptions FTB only?
Cyprus 2016 80 No No
Czech Republic 2018 45 5% No
Estonia 2014 50 15% No
Hungary 2018 25-60a No No
Lithuania 2015 40 Yesb No
Portugal 2018 50 Yesc No
Romania 2018 45 15% Yesd
Slovakia 2017 80e No No
Slovenia 2018 50-67f No No
Ireland - RIHL 2018 35 Yes Yes
Note: aDepending on interest rate, term, fixation period; bup to 60% in no more than 5% of cases; cup to 20% can
go to 60, 5% overall; d40% is general cap; eof residual income; fdepending on income.
From the application level dataset, we have information on the net income ratio
that was approved by the underwriters. Distributional statistics for this variable are
presented in Figure 13. Panel A presents the overall distribution of the debt service
ratio. It is clear that the majority of the approved DSTIs are close to the 30-35 per
cent cut offs: over half of the approved applications are for loans with an DSTI at
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or above 30 per cent. This is not surprising given that the applicants to this scheme
are likely to be income constrained and therefore looking to maximise the possible
drawdown size. This effect is more pronounced when the distribution is split up
between the 320k and 250k areas. The DSTI levels are higher in the 320k areas
which is likely to reflect the fact that these households are highly credit constrained
in the high house price areas therefore need to max out credit conditions.
Panel C presents a scatter plot of household income and the approved DSTI
levels. The scatter plot shows the sliding scale of DSTI limits and shows that many
of the high DSTI approvals go to higher income borrowers. The final scatter plot
presents the relationship between LTI and DSRI. The high correlation between these
two metrics does indicate that households are likely to be income constrained and
looking to maximise credit drawdowns along the affordability channel. To sum-
marise, the DSTI limit set for the RIHL scheme would appear to be in line with
that observed (if not strict) in an international context. The declining rate with in-
come is a prudent feature and in line with evidence on the definition of high housing
cost across the income distribution.
Figure 13: Distributional Statistics for Debt-Service-to-Income Ratios
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At present, all RIHL first time buyer loans are subject to a 90 per cent loan-
to-value restriction. This is in line with the Central Bank of Ireland’s calibration
for first time buyers. It is also the point which is suggested by Kelly et al. (2015)
at which ex post default risk rises in the loan-to-value ratio for FTBs. Table 5
presents the maximum loan-to-value restrictions that are in place in listed European
countries. These countries are recorded as having a maximum loan-to-value limit
in the ESRB/ECB macroprudential database. It can be seen that a majority are
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parametrising close to 90 per cent (the median and mean are 90 per cent). Given
these considerations, the current setting for the RIHL LTV limit would appear to
be line with international norms.
Table 5: Overview of Loan-to-Value Ratio Parameters Across Europe
Country Year Cap Exemptions FTB only
Czech Republic 2017 90 15%a No
Denmark 2014 95 No No
Estonia 2014 85/90b 15% No
Finland 2014 95 N/a Yesc
Ireland 2017 90 5% Yes
Iceland 2017 90 No Yesd
Latvia 2014 95 No No
Liechtenstein 2015 85 Yes No
Lithuania 2011 85 No No
Netherlands 2018 100 No No
Norway 2018 85 10% No
Poland 2013 80-90e No No
Portugal 2018 90 No No
Romania 2011 85-95f No No
Slovakia 2018 90 No No
Slovenia 1016 80 No No
Sweden 2010 85 No No
Local Authority Loans in Ireland
RIHL 2018 90 No Yes
Home Choice Loan 2009 92 No Yes
Source: ESRB/ECB Macroprudential Database. Note: aof loans between 80-90 per cent per quarter; b90 per cent
allowed with a KredEx guarantee; coverall cap 90 per cent; doverall cap 85 per cent; edepending on insurance;
fdepending on government guarantee.
4.2 Rejections and Applicant Screening
A critical part of ensuring credit risks are managed in a responsible manner relates
to how borrowers are screened, who is rejected and who is approved for credit. The
role that underwriting quality has in determining the loan risk ex post has been
well documented in the existing literature (Jiang et al., 2014). In this section, we
explore the share of rejected households8 and then undertake a simple econometric
exercise to test which households are more likely to be rejected. Second, we look at
the reasons provided by the underwriters for rejection. This provides insights into
the ex-ante risks in the scheme.
8Rejected here refers to applications recommended for rejection by the underwriters. The final
decision on whether to extend credit is taken by each Local Authority’s Credit Committee. See
O’Toole and Slaymaker (2020b) for more discussion of this.
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4.2.1 What is the rejection rate and who is rejected?
Table 6 presents the average rejection rate amongst the sample of borrowers that we
analyse. The data provided cover the full sample as well as subgroups for the 320K
and 250K areas. Overall just under 50 per cent of applicants are rejected from the
scheme. The rate is lower in counties with the 320K cap (45 per cent) relative to 54
per cent in the more rural areas.
Table 6: Rejection Rates
Overall 320k Area 250k Area
Accepted 51.9 54.5 45.2
Rejected 48.1 45.5 54.8
Obs 3,664 2,633 1,031
To provide more insight into which borrowers are rejected, we undertake a simple
multivariate probability analysis to test which household characteristics are associ-
ated with rejection:
Pr(Reji = 1) = f(Yiβ1 + Siβ2 + Liβ3 + ICBiβ4 + Xiβ) (1)
We link the probability of rejection to the log of income (Yi), the log of savings
(Si), log of loan size (Li), an ICB dummy for the household having a credit score
issue (ICBi), and other household characteristics including age, occupation, number
of dependants, employment status and region. The results of the probit model
estimates are presented in Table 7 as marginal effects. The reference groups for the
dummy variables are presented below the table.
A number of findings emerge. Households aged 30-40, which would be the main
household formation age bracket in Ireland, are least likely to be rejected. Rejec-
tions are decreasing in income and savings but increasing in the demanded loan
size (for a given income and savings level). Self-employed and contract/temporary
workers are more likely to be rejected relative to permanent employees. In terms of
household occupation, professional and associated professionals are less likely to be
rejected relative to managers. Households with dependants are also more likely to
be rejected for a given income which likely reflects the higher levels of expenditure
these households are faced with. Joint applications are also more likely to be re-
jected. The largest effect relates to households who have a negative credit record as
measured by their ICB report. This increases the likelihood of rejection by 56 per
cent relative to those without an ICB event. This is a very important result and
shows the underwriters are clearly using the past history of credit management to
determine default risk.
4.2.2 Reason for Underwriter Rejection
A final element that is useful for consideration, and available in our microdata, is the
specific reason given by the underwriters for rejection. These reasons are grouped
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Table 7: Determinants of Rejection: Probit Model Marginal Effects
All 320k 250k
Age 31-40 -0.0899*** -0.0900*** -0.0897**
(0.0221) (0.0255) (0.0441)
Age 41-50 -0.0427 -0.0584* -0.0193
(0.0280) (0.0332) (0.0532)
Age >50 -0.0236 -0.0696 0.0301
(0.0678) (0.0818) (0.130)
Log Income -0.322*** -0.348*** -0.299***
(0.0329) (0.0412) (0.0559)
Log Savings -0.0149*** -0.0128*** -0.0215***
(0.00303) (0.00356) (0.00590)
Log Loan 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 0.0177***
(0.00254) (0.00311) (0.00438)
Contract/Temporary 0.186** 0.147 0.268**
(0.0767) (0.0928) (0.136)
Self-employed 0.112*** 0.158*** 0.0281
(0.0407) (0.0504) (0.0673)
Professionals -0.0576* -0.0312 -0.114*
(0.0328) (0.0382) (0.0648)
Associate Professionals -0.0789** -0.0248 -0.235***
(0.0342) (0.0398) (0.0668)
Clerical Support -0.0657 -0.00985 -0.219***
(0.0414) (0.0482) (0.0804)
Services and Sales -0.0368 -0.0167 -0.106
(0.0364) (0.0438) (0.0665)
Craft and Trades -0.0295 0.0372 -0.162**
(0.0459) (0.0587) (0.0746)
Plant and Machinery -0.0803* -0.0809 -0.116
(0.0463) (0.0568) (0.0818)
Elementary -0.00723 0.0496 -0.144**
(0.0411) (0.0513) (0.0694)
Other -0.219** -0.227** -0.191
(0.0926) (0.110) (0.188)
1 Dependant 0.0967*** 0.113*** 0.0483
(0.0238) (0.0279) (0.0453)
2 Dependants 0.0826*** 0.115*** 0.0158
(0.0256) (0.0310) (0.0456)
3+ Dependants 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.124**
(0.0335) (0.0417) (0.0582)
Joint Application 0.0500** 0.0641** 0.0225
(0.0231) (0.0279) (0.0426)




Observations 3,664 2,632 1,030
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into: income sustainability (security of future income cash flows), repayment ca-
pacity insufficient, credit history issues (ICB report), net income ratio outside the
policy (NIR9 outside policy), the application breached other conditions of the credit
policy (such as the income limit or LTV ratio), poor financial management and poor
savings record.
Figure 14: Reasons Provided by Underwriters for Rejection
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In the 320k areas, it is clear that the majority of rejections are due to poor
repayment capacity or an NIR (DSTI) outside the policy. However, nearly one-
in-five was also due to an insufficient savings record. These reasons for rejection
suggest that the households which have received a decline on their application are
likely to be those with a higher credit risk. This screening should provide for good
ex-ante credit allocation. In the 250k areas the main reasons for rejection are similar.
However, a higher share of households are rejected due to a poor credit history on
other non-mortgage loans.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine a new public mortgage loan, the Rebuild-
ing Ireland Home Loan, which was introduced in Ireland following concerns around
credit market access for lower to middle income households. We have highlighted
the profile of demand for RIHL loans which has been mainly associated with mid-
dle income urban households who cannot access the mortgage market due to the
macroprudential regulations in the commercial mortgage market. We show that the
profile of demand appears to correspond to the portion of the income distribution
that is under-served by the existing banking sector.
We have given consideration as to how this scheme fits in with the broader man-
agement of systemic risk in the mortgage market. As the scheme provides higher
leverage credit to lower income households, it inevitably extends more credit at a
higher risk than would be the case under the current macroprudential rules. How-
ever, by combining strong underwriting practices with limiting the value of the
scheme in total euro terms, we argue that a specific instrument like this can sit
9NIR is what the scheme calls the debt-service-to-net-income ratio (DSTI)
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alongside a strong macroprudential framework and specifically target the external-
ity of reduced first time buyer credit access for lower income households that is a
consequence of the regulatory regime. The fact that this scheme can address credit
demand issues but not create risk to the overall system, as would be the case if the
overall loan-to-income calibration were loosened in Ireland, is, we argue, a benefit
of the scheme. We have also shown that the scheme appears to be calibrated in
line with international norms in terms of the loan-to-value ratio. Rejections have
been approximately one in two and accepted applicants are more likely to be higher
income, permanent employees which should bode well in terms of ex-post default
risk.
Despite its benefits, the scheme does have a number of drawbacks both from
an operational perspective and in a mortgage lending context. Many of these are
discussed in O’Toole and Slaymaker (2020b) but some are worthy of a mention here.
From a credit risk perspective, while the underwriting is done centrally by experts in
the Irish Housing Agency, the final lending decision is made by the individual local
authority and their own Credit Committee. If this is to lead to divergence from the
underwriting assessment, then the credit risk in the mortgage pool will rise. As the
loans are going to lower income households relative to commercial lending, managing
this risk is critical to ensuring considerable defaults do not occur. Furthermore, how
local authorities deal with arrears cases, and indeed any moral hazard from any
lower perceived repossession risk is also important.
Finally, while O’Toole and Slaymaker (2020b) note the overall level of lending at
e200mn in total for the first tranche is insufficiently large to impact general market
house prices (representing less than 4 per cent of total first time buyer lending in
Ireland in 2019), if this lending were to be concentrated into a particular area, it may
have localised impact on house prices. Given the well documented supply issues in
the Irish market (Allen-Coghlan et al., 2020), understanding how best to ensure the
scheme does not cause inflationary pressures should be the focus of future research.
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